Neuropower
Section 1. Introduction
In the words of Maurizio Lazzarato, “In the societies of control, power relations come to be expressed through the action at a distance of one mind on another, through the brain’s power to affect and become affected, which is mediated and enriched by technology…The institutions of the societies of control are thus characterised by the use of technologies acting at a distance, rather than of mechanical technologies (societies of sovereignty) or thermodynamic technologies (disciplinary societies).”1 The implications of this statement go to the very core of the biopolitical questions that I would like to address in what follows. I will develop three lines of thought. First, in the transition from the Disciplinary Society to the Society of Control and onward to what Lazzarato refers to as noo-politics, the focus of power and the technology at its disposal is not directed toward the materiality of the body but, instead, its psychic life, particularly its memories and attention, recognising that the mind and the body are inextricably linked through voluntary and involuntary, somatic and autonomic, striated and smooth conditions.2,3 Secondly, I would like to extend this idea of noo-politics to include a new focus of sovereignty: that of neural plasticity itself and its potential as a generator of fields of difference that are moulded according to the new conditions produced by post-Fordist deregulation, especially its effect upon a distributed and delimited workplace, defined as it is by a dilated time-space continuum. In the end, this new situation creates new possibilities for the conditions of the brain/mind. I would like to suggest that the reconfiguration of the brain/mind is actually the site of the performative gestures of the non-productive labour of the communicative virtuoso. “Let us consider carefully what defines the activity of virtuosos, of performing artists. First of all, theirs is an activity which finds its own fulfillment…in itself, without objectifying itself into an end product, without settling into a ‘finished product’, or into an object which would survive the performance. Secondly, it is an activity which requires the presence of others, which exists only in the presence of an audience.”4 This necessity of an audience or a social mind as a roving, wet, mutable, organic interface, where the inscription of the oral history or memory of that performance is inscribed in the static and dynamic conditions of the material brain, is the key to what follows. Finally, I will propose that the multitude is an adequate description of, and metaphor for, the way that these new forms of the social as a multiplicity, formulated in the conditions of post-Fordist labour, produce the conditions of the dynamic, manifold, and metastable brain and mind. These new conditions of the workplace leak into the world beyond, transforming it, with the help of artistic and architectural interventions, according to the changed dynamic contingencies, for instance, of the anyplace, anytime, whatever. These new conditions are then coupled to a plastic brain/mind. Paolo Virno eloquently elaborates this when he says, “The potential for working, bought and sold just like another commodity, is labour not yet objectified, ‘labour as subjectivity’”.5 Labour as a series of performative gestures is continually evolving and is delineated as a form of cultural plasticity that produces new forms of subjectivity. On the one hand, I will look at the regulation of the rhythms of the brain, especially its synchronous firings, as the very conditions through which sovereignty directs the Institutional understanding, coupling it to the minds of its constituents. On the other I will look at the means through which art and architecture deregulate and uncouple these dynamic potentials, rearranging them according to another logic.
Constancy, and the regulated, synchronous, dynamic conditions that help to define it, form one of the basic conditions that the institutional understanding utilises to administer bodies and minds to produce a people. As we will see shortly, what is constantly repeated, linked together, and then magnified, for instance by the technologies of neo-liberal global capital, becomes the object of attention and subsequently selection in the brain and mind. Art and architecture, as experimental practices, can discover the latent and hidden variability inherent in a metastable world, in order to constitute new forms of temporal binding as artworks and built space. John Cage’s interest in noise and dissonance is one such example of works that produce other rhythms and syncopations. Recently, artistic and architectural experiments with time-based media in video and film, performance art, and social and kinetic sculpture have been a means to make real the immanent conditions of time. Through the use of distributed, mediated circuits such as television and the Internet, formerly unrecognised concepts of time diffuse into mainstream culture, where personal and cultural effects are possible.
Thus the brain’s potential is sculpted as a result of changes not only in its static elements, the neurons and neural networks with their axonal flows, myelination, synaptic neurochemicals and tight junctions, but in the dynamic apparatus of coordinated oscillation potentials and temporal signatures as well. The dynamic flows of the world in their infinite variability, some of which are produced naturally and others that are invented or discovered by art and architecture, are sampled as a DJ samples music, and, when possible, coupled to an assortment of frequencies that the brain has at its disposal in order to encode them. This coupling process has implications for how the brain is sculpted by cultural experience. Constancy and repetition, especially when globally distributed, are intense directors of attention. Shock and the new are features of modernist cultural excess, and are the artistic rebuttal destabilising and uncoupling institutionalised dictates. Recently, shock has found its way into the institutional armamentarium and is now being used as a way to administrate affect.9 This is the very recipe of emergent behaviour. I would like to elaborate the way that art and architecture have adapted to the new contingencies of our interconnected and networked world with new labour practices and results. Art and architecture, in their most utopian sense, reconfigure the distribution of the static and dynamic contingencies of the sensible and its virtual. They redistribute sensibility to compete with the institutional conditions of the mind’s eye. Art power and neuropower are part of the same equation.10
Section 2. Branding the Mind: Not witha Hot Iron but with Invisible Traces
It may be that the memory capacity of an intensive network is much greater than that of an extensive network. Hierarchical memory systems are limited forms of memory representation tied to a single or maybe a few readings. Think, for instance, of the hierarchical taxonomy established by Carl Linnaeus, an 18th century Swedish naturalist. The hierarchy established by Linnaeus and his followers is the following: kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species. A species is classified according to a specific pathway within certain distributions that does not allow for much flexibility but has the advantage of consistency. When film storyboards are set up in the same way, the possibility for variability in the plot is also limited to a specific pathway following specific actions and responses. This is a characteristic of classic film according to Gilles Deleuze. A non-hierarchical, diagrammatic representation, on the other hand, can store far more information, since its non-narrative character and distributed format allow for a plethora of readings, interpretations, and memories. Recent DVD formats that allow viewers to choose other sequences of chapters and endings have expanded these potentials. This can also be seen in the improvisational jazz of Miles Davis, or the Building Without a Plan of Jonah Friedman, or the social sculptures of Joseph Beuys. In embracing the pluripotentiality of a physical and discursive space, these works increase the potential for different readings and interpretations. This is just the point. The very nature of the multiple pathways of information flow circulating through intense nodal points in a diagram makes possible what is called degeneracy in geometry and quantum theory. This theory has also recently been applied to neural networks, in which the same network can participate in an unlimited number of other networks, both local and global. A social network can operate similarly, and a single network can have different roles in different social contexts. Unlike the limited number of readings inherent in linear or hierarchical knowledge, degenerative intensive networks allow for a multiplicity of readings. Thus intensive networks carry the potential for more information generation and storage. A brain/mind that could parasitise such a network would be able to extend itself into richer sources of information and, through the process of memory, instantiate those networks into itself as intensive memories. When that brain/mind moulds itself as the result of epigenesis to the contingencies of that non-linearity and excess, its capabilities are greatly enhanced. When these mechanisms are tethered to what is referred to as the Baldwin Effect, the brain/mind, rather than simply adapting to these conditions, becomes these conditions.18But there is still more to this story, as we begin to look at branding in the larger context of the changing conditions of immaterial labour and general intelligence. Initially, as just we saw, the brand was still focused optimally on a target audience, but it also has a greater potentiality, through stochastic nomadologies, for instance, of conversation mappings such as gossip or word search engines on the Internet, to reach audiences indirectly. The true power of post-Fordian network conditions is in the production of new forms of general intelligence; the commodification of what are referred to as externalities, submerged intensive networks that form the once secret relations of brand equity. The rhizomatic unconsciousness of the brand equity now creates value in unseen and unknown ways that are now made real. They now become real abstractions, as these once unrecognised factors form complex collaged loopings inside their own distributions and assert themselves as constant and repeatable norms that can be commodified with an assigned value, generating future profits as a part of predetermined budgets. As such, the contingencies of their value, which might have once been taken for granted, now, with the help of new intensive computer calculations, can be specified, analysed, and depended upon. This commodification of externalities is the new definition of immaterial labour and general intelligence.19 These different parts of the branding networks intensify their desire quotient and the degree to which their products capture and produce new audiences.
Each brand has its own network of users, who form nodes and become sites of attraction for other brand networks with which they form brand allegiances. Through the direct and indirect sharing of this product loyalty, branding networks produce social networks. The primary network acts to link together in time secondary and tertiary immanent networks. When the target audience is stimulated by, say, an ad for dishwasher powder, this has a ripple effect that energises all other networks with which the target audience has allegiances—networks related, for example, to the dishwasher they are using to clean dishes, to the water softening agent, to the type of glassware they may wash, to the number of dinner parties they might have, and so forth. As this is also true for others, the production of externalities and their overlapping in distant cultural fields has the indirect result of a migration of desire in a roundabout trajectory throughout the social and cultural field. Unlike a normal feedback loop that is a moment-to-moment register of stimulation and effect along a single channel, think here of a thermostat: branding and the externalities it generates result in a manifold dynamic stimulation, both synchronous and diachronous, direct and indirect. The end effect registered varies according to the synchronicity or lack of convergent discharges affecting the original brand equity. In such branded systems, collective strategies become each other’s potential markets. In a sense, every time a commercial or ad appears for one product, a current affects all the other networks directly or indirectly associated with it. As such, their affect and effect are emergent.
Section 3. The Distribution and Redistribution of the Sensible
Section 4. FromNoo-powerto Neuropower
In order to examine the redirection of control from the external and material to the mental and neurological mentioned at the beginning of this text, I would like to start with a quotation from Maurizio Lazzarato, a second generation “Operaist”, who recognised this new biopolitical dimension as defined by such terms as “mass intellectuality”, “immaterial labour”, and “general intellect”. These concepts are recontextualised in terms of the new nature of productive labour and its living development in society. “In order not to name such different things with the same word, one could define the new relations of power, which take memory and its conatus (attention) as their object… noo-politics. Noo-politics (the ensemble of the techniques of control) is exercised on the brain. It involves above all attention, and is aimed at the control of memory and its virtual power.”25
“The general intellect is social knowledge turned into the principal productive force; it is the complex of cognitive paradigms, artificial languages, and conceptual clusters which animate social communication and forms of life. The general intellect distinguishes itself from the “real abstractions” typical of modernity, which are all anchored to the principle of equivalence.”30 Enlisting the communicative industries, pharmaceutical corporations, military-industrial complexes, and scientific community, sovereignty has produced sophisticated, machine-like assemblages to organise the distribution of the sensible to comport with the new conditions of the general intellect and the mind. These assemblages are free-floating and no longer anchored to an object. I refer to this development as cognitive ergonomics, because the contingencies of the real and “potential space” of the brain’s cognitive apparatus, its neural plasticity, have been elaborated to meet the demands of the constructed hegemonic social/cultural dynamis with a maximum of efficiency.31
Section 5. Cultural Difference and the Sampling of Neural Biodiversity
Neural plasticity refers to the ability of neurons, dendrites, and their synapses to be modified by experience. The famous neurobiologist Marcus Jacobson defines neural plasticity as a process through which the nervous system adjusts to changes in the internal and external milieu. Those adjustments can come in response to changes in the external environment mediated by the senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch and by the autonomic sense.33 Here, we see an analogy with Rancière’s distribution of the sensible, especially in the inclusion of the autonomic system, which includes of the emotional and affective subsystems. Secondly the nervous system can adjust to internal changes, such as those that occur after focal brain injuries, in which the brain may recover as long as that injury occurs before puberty. Language production and comprehension can also be affected by plasticity. Most lesions affecting the language areas of children are due to strokes that occur in the perinatal period. The language areas of the brain are represented in early life in both the right and left hemispheres of the brain. By the age of nine or just before puberty, a process occurs called lateralisation, which stabilises the area in and around the anterior left temporal lobe of the left hemisphere, designating it for language understanding (reception) and production. Children who sustain a stroke in the perinatal period do not suffer serious speech defects because the brain is able to adapt. Even children who suffer a stroke, or, worse, a brain tumour in the left hemisphere requiring surgery on the speech area, are able to recover almost all of their language abilities, since the right hemisphere can take over the function with only partial deficit. Adults suffering from stroke in the same area develop either receptive or motor aphasias, illnesses of speech comprehension or production, depending on what part of the language area is affected.34 What this implies is quite interesting in the light of this essay. If the region of the brain specialised for language is destroyed, other, very different, regions, in the right hemisphere in right-handed individuals, may take over its function. The fact that sometimes language is represented bilaterally and that, in some left handed people, language is lateralised to the opposite hemisphere suggests that there is a pluripotential neurobiologic capacity to be unmasked in an area of the brain not normally engineered for a given purpose. What is important is that up to the age of approximately nine years of age, the brain retains the potential to be modified by a linguistic, interpersonal, cultural environment. “Once language exists in the interpersonal, cultural environment, the more general power and tendency of the human brain through imitation and related mechanisms to shape its growth around recurring features of the environment in which it finds itself allows the capability for language to develop in the absence of the areas that many thousands of years ago provided the functional characteristics that allowed human beings and human societies to first develop languages.”35 The same could be said for language acquisition. A child born to Japanese parents living in London learns to speak English without an accent. The same could be said for the English child living in Tokyo who learns to speak Japanese fluently. Second language acquisition is more difficult after the age of nine than before. This model for neural plasticity and language acquisition is also good for understanding the effects of the information economy upon the brain/mind.
Section 6. Sculpting the Brain, And I Don’t Mean Rodin
Today more than ever, it is culture that modifies the brain. I would like to show that, in fact, when the conditions of the information economy and the concomitant general intelligence are expressed as conditions of intensive networks of real abstraction, real intensivity, the possibility for this sculpting emerges and becomes very powerful. I am utilising the theory of neuronal group selection as formulated by Gerald Edelman, not forgetting the important contributions of Jean Pierre Changeux, for what follows.36,37 Permutations of this theory may evolve over the coming years that will eventually replace it. They may not so much prove it wrong as more accurately reproduce the conditions of the ever-evolving nature of the world for which a new model of brain and mind development might need to be adapted. The theory of neuronal group selection, or neural selectionism, is made up of three components. Simply stated there, is the primary repertoire, which is a product of developmental selection; the secondary repertoire, produced by experiential selection; and reentry, which stabilises and elaborates upon the secondary repertoire. I will cover developmental and experiential selection first, leaving reentry for later. The primary repertoire consists of the initial variability in the anatomy of the brain at birth, which is produced by a process called developmental selection. First, it relates to the variation that results from the combination of the DNA contributed by the father’s sperm and the mother’s egg as two very diverse genetic heritages. Secondly, it relates to the history of the species itself in its evolutionary journey and the genes that reflect that history. Finally it is the result of events that take place during gestation. For example, the effects of smoking, drinking, or cocaine use on the developing foetal brain are well known. The combined effect of these three processes is the production of the neurobiologic common, from which the brain/mind emerges through its engagement with culture.
I would like to call attention to the primary repertoire as the site of what is referred to as neural biodiversity. “Biodiversity is a composite term used to embrace the variety of types, forms, spatial arrangements, processes, and interactions of biological systems at all scales and levels of organisation from genes to species to ecosystems, along with the evolutionary history that led to their existence.”38 Neural biodiversity, by analogy, is, first of all, a species-specific condition that refers to the natural variability of neural elements, including their physical and chemical idiosyncrasies and the neurobiological apparatus, which allows for the neural plastic potentiality to express itself. It is a condition of that species’ evolutionary history and contains therein the history of the neurobiological adaptations that were required by that species’ ascendance.
The secondary repertoire is a result of epigenesis and neural plasticity during a process called experiential selection. Epigenesis refers to the process by which the environment affects the patterns of stimulation and communication in the neurons and neural networks of the primary repertoire. Hebbian theory, which states that neurons that fire together wire together, is operative in the primary repertoire, where spontaneous electrical activity stimulates genetically prescribed built-in networks. In the secondary repertoire, that electrical activity is joined by what is generated by objects and object relations in the world and, in the case of our world, the real-imaginary-virtual interface (RIVI).39 The RIVI, as used here, is made up of the following: real objects, natural and produced, of which cinematic projections are included; images and facts that are projected onto these objects from our unconscious, dream, and drug induced states; those made by artists in response to other unconscious provocations; and virtual objects and relations as they exist in the internal architecture of the computer or the Web and as they become e-verted for designed products, architecture, or the city as a plan. Although we have defined the primary repertoire and the secondary repertoire separately, they are part of the same overlapping and interdependent process.
What is key to these changes is that experiential selection, unlike natural selection in evolution, occurs as a result, not of differential reproduction, but rather of the differential amplification of certain neuronal populations. What this means is that those neurons and neural networks that are most frequently and intensely stimulated by, for instance, advertised toys that appear and reappear in real and televised environments, or objects which are repeatedly pointed out as significant by the parents, will develop more efficient firing patterns or become progressively more phase locked, synchronously tethered together in time, which gives them a selective advantage over those that are not.
In other words, these neurons are apt to be more likely favoured over other neurons and neuronal networks in future encounters with those stimuli. These stimuli can be grouped together into larger ensembles of stimulation that are persistently aligned in the environment and thus are always coded together.40 Branded environments are one such example, where, through corporate agreements, Nike Shoes, Post Grape Nuts, Hertz Rental Car, Air Berlin, and Sony Music appear together in the commercial landscape of billboards and airline magazines. The institutional understanding and the sovereignty whose bidding it does is empowered by this network of cultural signifiers. What Paul Virilio had formerly referred to in the representational and extensive era as phatic signifiers today become fields of phatic signifiers, embedded in the intensive logics of emerging meaning produced by the new apparatus of global culture. As we have seen, these networks are supplemented by a field of direct and indirect externalities that produce intensive socialised networks.
Each brand is made up of its brand equity and its externalities that, together, compete with other assemblages for the attention of the market place. These selective pressures are coupled to selective pressures in the brain/mind. The conditions of intensivity integrate dynamic flows into the distribution of sensibility that these branded environments are instrumental in producing. (One might argue here, as an aside, that, in the transition from the Disciplinary Society to the Society of Control, the conditions of this intensivity and this integration of dynamic flows, as they jump the normal perceptual mechanism and direct themselves to the brain itself, might instead be called a distribution of the insensible.) Dynamic contingencies play a role in their fit and value. Repeated gossip, for example, differentially stimulates networks that make up the externalities that surround brand equity. The more a certain externality is stimulated, the more it comes to play a direct and constant role in the recognition of the product by the public and the more it indirectly stimulates other related networks. In the end, these externalities evolve to become commodified real factors that are now considered as a direct influence. The same is happening in the brain. These intense branded networks stimulate networks in the brain/mind that register and act on them preferentially, in the end having effects on the overall architecture of the brain/mind. In the competition for neural space during critical periods of development, neural networks selected for by these branded environments will out-compete those that are not selected for, which either wither away or are incorporated in other assemblages where they can continue to play a role and be stimulated.
Section 7. Time Never Won or Never Lost
A third tenet of the theory of neuronal group selection is called reentry. Reentry is defined as the recurrent parallel exchange of neural signals between neuronal groups taking place at many different levels of brain organisation: locally within populations of neurons, within a single brain area, and across brain areas. The importance of reentry as a mechanism of neural integration has been recognised. The anatomically distinct areas of the brain, the primary sensory areas such as the visual cortex as well as the more modern associative cortices, consist of distinct areas that code for different information.42 For instance, the visual cortex, as the research of Semir Zeki and others has shown, is made up of functionally segregated areas that code for specific attributes such as the form and colour of a visual object. These areas are linked by what are referred to as cortico-cortical and thalamo-cortical connections because they connect regions of the visual cortex together and the thalamus, a subcortical structure, to the cortex. In some ways, each of these areas sample and produce maps of the world based on their specific biased apparatus. For instance, area V4 of the occipital cortex samples the world according to colour—that is, its cells are wavelength selective—while those of V5 are motion selective.43 But we don’t see the world as disjointed patterns of colour and motion but rather as a seamless whole. Why is this? It is through reentry that these disparate regions are linked together in register, producing a picture/ image that is integrated: this is referred to as binding. These different registers are bound together. We also know through experience that several such sensory areas can work together. When eating an apple, you are using taste, smell, and vision as well as coordinating various tactile and motor repertoires as the apple is adjusted to bring it in register with the mouth and tongue. Reentry is one way that these maps are integrated together. Superimposed on these primary areas are meta-representations coded for in association areas and linked to corresponding areas of other parts of the brain, such as the frontal lobe, hippocampus, cingulated gyrus, and so on. Eating an apple is a planned event that rehearses other, already registered memories of former interactions with the apple, the satiation of hunger, and so forth. Reentry also plays a role in binding these regions as global mappings, since it refers to the whole brain as it is activated at the same time.
Section 8. Brainweb: Hierarchical vs. Distributed Networks
There are two basic theories of the solution to the problem of integration in the brain. The first model is essentially hierarchical, in which there is a progressive increase in the specificity of the neurons as you move from the peripheral to the more central areas. Diverse processing streams achieve confluence at higher layers, finally reaching what is referred to as a master area. Such a master area has not been found, although feed-forward convergence is an important anatomical feature of the cortex.
An alternate model, which has broad implications for our understanding of the brain as a multiplicity, is the reentrant model of integration. The two main tenets of this theory are that neurons work together in “neuronal groups” or local collectives and that they correlate their activity through reentry. “As we have already discussed, reentry leads to the synchronisation of the activity of neuronal groups in different brain maps, binding them into circuits capable of temporally coherent output. Reentry is thus the central mechanism by which the spatiotemporal coordination of diverse sensory and motor events takes place.”46
Section 9. Perception in Action: Neuropower
A new model called situatedness has posited a much more adaptive and action-oriented system.52 This model assumes that cognition is not built on context- invariant percepts but instead must adapt itself to the continually changing environment; that of the moving subject imposing himself or herself on a nervous system in action. Cognitive functions are now being appreciated more in terms of top-down strategies rather than the bottom-up strategies of classic neuroscience, although bottom-up strategies are still understood as playing an important role. These top-down strategies have shifted the concept of perception away from reflex-driven systems of reactivity toward systems that are driven by expectations derived from previous experience.53 This new shift towards expectation has implications for models of neural systems in the information age, because perception is now “dominated” by intrinsic factors such as attention, memory, and anticipation. “The data reviewed indicate that top-down processing is in many instances, associated with modulation of the temporal structure of both ongoing and stimulus evoked activity. In a wider sense, top-down influences can be defined as intrinsic sources of contextual modulation of neural processing. Obviously, top down factors include the activity of systems involved in goal definition, action planning, working memory and selective attention.”54
Notes and Bibliography
1 Maurizio Lazzarato, “Life and the Living in the Societies of Control,” in Martin Fuglsang and Bent Meier Sorensen, eds., Deleuze and the Social (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), page 186.
2 Lazzarato, ibid., page 186. The modulation of memory would thus be the most important function of noo-politics.
3 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), page 30: “The productivity of bodies and the value of affect, however, are absolutely central in this context. We will elaborate the three primary aspects of immaterial labour in the contemporary economy: the communicative labour of industrial production that has newly become linked in informational networks, the interactive labour of symbolic analysis and problem solving, and the labour of the production and manipulation of affects.”
4 Paolo Virno, The Grammar of the Multitude (New York: Semiotext, 2004). page 52.
5 Virno, ibid., page 83.
6 This explanation is not reductionist or deterministic in the traditional sense. In this model, the human brain has only a finite number of prescribed and ready-to-use neural networks at birth. In addition, however, it has a series of potentialities and apparatus that are inherited, such as neuroplasticity and the ability to generate, for instance, oscillatory potentials, give it the ability to become reorganised within a set of many possible environmental contingencies.
7 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, page 400: “The general right to control its own movement is the multitude’s ultimate demand for global citizenship. This demand is radical insofar as it challenges the fundamental apparatus of imperial control over the production and life of the multitude. Global citizenship is the multitude’s power to reappropriate control over space and thus to design the new cartography.”
8 Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, Neo-avant-garde and the Culture Industry (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), page xxi. Three further considerations must be kept in mind. First of all, art and architecture are not immune to the conditions of the institutional understanding, because large architectural projects require considerable funding, and artists in some circumstances must participate in art fairs. Second, it is not only that which is sensible that is essential, but also how the underlying conditions that produce the dynamics of the conscious and unconscious, the actual and virtual: how in fact they interrelate to mutate the flow of sensorial dispositions or are subsumed in a matrix of as yet unrecognised and sublime percepts. Finally, capitalism utilises a process that I am here referring to as the institutionalised alternative to modify, absorb, and limit the cultural implications of the new and different. Janis Joplin’s song of resistance, “Mercedes Benz” (1970), becomes a sound track for a Mercedes Benz commercial of the late 1990’s. Different people from a cross-section of British culture perform, lip-synching the song while a Mercedes Benz maneuvers its way through the city. Just as empire dependends on the multitude’s need to move for its access to the labour streams that power its engines, capitalism must not restrict the ingenuity of the avant-garde’s movements too much. The radicality of new forms of knowledge produces the fissures and eruptions necessary to expose the new surfaces and territories that capitalism can use as an inspiration to invent new products and markets. Benjamin Buchloh’s remarks are pertinent here. “This type of installation art and photoconceptualism now produces a techno-lingo of the image that can pride itself in being the first to have fully absorbed the very technologies that made the culture of the spectacle and the production of advertisement imagery a monolithic global power. Such affirmative mimesis makes it seem inescapable that artistic practices would, if not actually pave the way for, at least finally succumb to the powers of spectacle culture to permeate all conventions of perception and communication without any form of resistance whatsoever. It implies that even mere thought and the slightest gesture of opposition appear dwarfed and ludicrous in the face of totalitarian control and domination.”
9 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Picador, 2007).
10 Boris Groys, Art Power (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), page 12: “Thus the question of the autonomy of art seems to me the central question in the context of any discussion of the relationship between art and resistance. And my answer to this question is: Yes we can speak about the autonomy of art; and, yes, art does have an autonomous power of resistance.”
11 Manuel De Landa, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 2002) pages 59-61.
12 Warren Neidich, “Resistance is Futile: The Neurobiopolitics of Global Consciousness,” in Sarai Reader 06: Turbulence, (Delhi: Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, 2006) page 226.
13 Scott Lash and Celia Lury, Global Culture Industry (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007) page 5.
14 Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind”, Analysis 58:10-23, 1998. Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, vol XXI (P. Grim, ed.), 1998.
15 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), page 38.
16 http://forgefx.com/casestudies/ggs/deicing-training-simulator.html
17 Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind”, page 5.
18 David. J. Depew, “Baldwin and His Many Effects,” in Bruce H. Weber and David J. Depew, eds., Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), page 10: “In recent years, a number of evolutionary theorists have spoken well of a turn-of-the-twentieth-century idea that since the nineteen fifties has gone by the name of “the Baldwin Effect.” The general thrust of the idea is to urge that, under some conditions, learned behaviours can affect the direction and rate of evolutionary change by natural selection. In such cases, cultural inheritance of a learned behaviour across an indefinite number of generations creates a ‘breathing space’ in which inherited factors favourable to the adaptive behaviour in question that either already exist, happen to crop up, or can be stimulated by the change in question —there is some dispute about this— will move along the channel already cut by culture, thereby converting learned behaviours into genetic adaptations or, alternatively, supporting learned behaviours by related genetic adaptations. In either case, natural selection will have ratified evolutionary vectors that learning began.” (page 4).
19 Yann M. Boutang, “Mutations in Contemporary Urban Space and the Cognitive Turning Point of Capitalism, Transactions”, from the conference Trans_Thinking the City, The Mind in Architecture; From Biopolitics to Noos-Politics, (Delft: Delft School of Architecture, October, 2008.).
20 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics (London: Continuum, 2004) page 85.
21 Gabriel Rockhill, quoted in Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, page 1: “[I refer] to what Rancière himself has called the distribution of the sensible, or the system of divisions and boundaries that define among other things, what is visible and audible within a particular aesthetico-political regime.”
22 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, page 12.
23 Gabriel Rockhill, quoted in Jacques Rancière, page 4.
24 Paolo Virno, The Grammar of the Multitude, page 70.
25 Maurizio Lazzarato, “Life and the Living in the Societies of Control,” in Deleuze and the Social, page 186.
26 Bruce Wexler, Brain and Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), page 102: “These mechanisms permit relatively rapid and selective direction of attention to objects at a distance as well as those close at hand, and allow parental influence over infant perceptual (and related cognitive) activity as well as motor activity. Through such means, adults influence what in the continuous stream of sensory input infants are most aware of, become most familiar with, and think most about. The corresponding effects on brain activity are pronounced making internally concrete the invisible connection between a pointed finger and an attended object.”
27 Peter R. Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), page 5: “While neural plasticity probably exists in the nervous systems of all species, it appears to be most marked in specific regions of the human cerebral cortex, in areas that subserve the so-called higher cortical functions, including language, mathematical ability, musical ability and ‘executive functions’. Regions of the cerebral cortex that subserve voluntary motor activity and primary sensory functions, such as visual and auditory information processing, appear to be less malleable.”
28 Jean-Pierre Changeux, “Genes, Brains, and Culture: From Monkey to Human,” in Dehaene et al., From Monkey Brain to Human Brain (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), page 83: “Even less understood is the expansion of the cerebral cortex that took place in the course of vertebrate brain evolution, in particular from monkey to man. The number of neurons per cortical column is rather uniform throughout the vertebrates. Thus the surface area of the cortex, i.e. the number of columns, appears as the primary target of the evolutionary changes. The gestation lasts 21 days in the rat, 165 in the macaque and 280 in humans, and the rapid phase of synaptogenesis (which starts two months before birth in macaque and four to five months after birth in man) lasts 136 days in macaque and 470 days in humans. One may further speculate that the fast expansion of the frontal lobe and parietotemporal areas, which contributed to the evolutionary origins of Homo sapiens’ brain, resulted from the exceptionally prolonged action of some still unidentified developmental process.”
29 Paolo Virno, The Grammar of the Multitude, page 79.
30 Virno, ibid., page 87.
31 Warren Neidich, Blow-up: Photography, Cinema and the Brain (Los Angeles: D.A.P., 2003).
32 Gilles Deleuze, quoed in Gregory Flaxman. ed., The Brain is the Screen, Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), page 41.
33 Marcus Jacobson, Developmental Neurobiology (New York: Plenum Press, 1991), page 26.
34 Peter R. Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity, page 140.
35 Bruce Wexler, Brain and Culture, page 121.
36 Gerald Edelman, The Remembered Present (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1989).
37 Jean-Pierre Changeux and Stanilslas Dehaene, “Neuronal Models of Cognitive Functions,” in Mark H. Johnson, ed., Brain Development and Cognition (New York: Blackwell, 1993), pages 363-403.
38 R.J. Scholes et al., “Toward a Global Biodiversity Observing System,” Science, Volume 321, page 1044.
39 Wolf Singer, “Coherence as an Organizing Principle of Cortical Functions,” in Olaf Sporns and Giulio Tononi, eds., Selectionism and the Brain (San Diego: Academic Press,1994), page 158: “The probability that neurons synchronise their responses both within a particular area and across areas should reflect some of the Gestalt criteria used for perceptual grouping… Individual cells must be able to change rapidly the partners with which they synchronise their responses if stimulus configurations change and require new associations…If more than one object is present in a scene, several distinct assemblies should form. Cells belonging to the same assembly should exhibit synchronous response episodes whereas no consistent temporal relations should exist between the discharges of neurons belonging to different assemblies.”
40 Giulio Tononi, “Reentry and Cortical Integration,” in Selectionism in the Brain, page 129: “Two of the main tenets of this theory are that neurons act together in local collectives called neuronal groups and that they communicate with each other and correlate their activity by a process called reentry.”
41 Bruce Wexler, Brain and Culture, page 108-9: “Given the prolonged postnatal physical maturation of these structures in human beings, lasting until or beyond puberty, it is not surprising that adults must provide these functions if they are to be present in the behaviour of infants and children. Essentially, then, the frontal lobes of parents are functionally linked with the lower brain centres and the sensory, motor and association cortices of their infants and children. While the child’s frontal lobes are developing, the parents’ brains provide frontal lobe functions for the child.”
42 Giulio Tononi, “Reentry and Cortical Integration,” page 129.
43 Semir Zeki, ed., A Vision of the Brain (New York: Blackwell,1993), pages 122-129: “Here, then, was a visual area which, like V5 and V3, received its input from V1, but had properties which were remarkably different from those of V5 or V3. It seemed difficult to avoid the conclusion that there must be a division of labour among the visual areas of the prestriate cortex, with different areas undertaking different tasks in parallel.” (page 126).
44 Manuel Castels, The Rise of the Network Society (New York: Blackwell, 2000), page 492.
45 Francisco Varela et al., “The Brainweb: Phase Synchronization and Large-Scale Integration,” Neuroscience, Volume 2, April, 2001.
46 Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi, Consciousness, How Matter Becomes Imagination (London: Penguin Books, 2000), page 85.
47 Giulio Tononi, “Reentry and Cortical Integration”, page 144.
48 Francisco Varela et al., “The Brainweb: Phase Synchronization and Large-Scale Integration,” pages 229-239.
49 J.A. Scott Kelso, “An Essay on Understanding the Mind,” Ecological Psychology, 20:194, 2008.
50 Giulio Tononi, “Reentry and Cortical Integration”, page 148.
51 Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, Neo-avant-garde and the Culture Industry, page xxiv: “Therefore I would suggest that only at this time did a radically different basis for critical interventions in the discursive and institutional frameworks determining the production and the reception of contemporary art become established, generating propositions of audience reception, distribution form, and institutional critique that were distinctly different from the critical models invoked by Burger.”
52 Engel, A.K. et al., “Dynamic Predictions: Oscillations and Synchrony in Top-Down Processing,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, October, 2001, page 704.
53 Wolf Singer, “Binding by Synchrony”, Scholarpedia 2007 http:www.scolarpedia.org/article/binding_by_synchrony: “These indicated that synchronised oscillatory activity is not only stimulus driven but does occur across widely distributed networks of interconnected cortical areas in anticipation of an attention demanding discrimination task. This observation led to the hypothesis that self-generated oscillatory activity in the beta and gamma frequency range could be a correlate of an executive subsystem required for the execution of the anticipated task.”
54 A.K. Engel, et al., “Dynamic Predictions: Oscillations and Synchrony in Top-Down Processing,” page 714.
55 Ibid, page 714: “A crucial ingredient of the model is that synchrony can be intrinsically generated (not imposed on the system by external stimuli) and modulated by intrinsic signals that reflect experience, contextual influences and action goals.”
56 Editorial, “A Manifesto for Neuromarketing Science,” Journal of Consumer Behaviour, Volume, 7, Issue, 4-5, pages 263-271.